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The Validity Generalization & Extension of the Revised Iptis

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Hanshaw,

William J.

1976

THE VALIDITY GENERALIZATION AND EXTENSION
OF THE REVISED IPTIS

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Psychology
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
William J. Hanshaw
July 1976

THE VALIDITY GENERALIZATION AND EXTENSION
OF THE REVISED IPTIS

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William J. Hanshaw

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31 pages

Directed by: D. A. Shiek, R. L. Miller, and C. C. Layne

Department of Psychology

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The basic theoretical concepts of Rational-Emotive and Rational-Behavior Therapy were discussed along with a psychometric study of an inventory measuring irrational tendencies. The revised Irrational Personality Traits Inventory Scale (IPTIS), an inventory reported to measure how an individual thinks, feels, and acts, was investigated as to the soundness of its psychometric characteristics. More specifically, the purpose of this study was to: (a) determine the reliability of the revised IPTIS with a new sample from an older population, i.e., college students, (b) assess its concurrent validity with a measure of neuroticism, and (c) evaluate the possible effects of a socially desirable response set on the revised IPTIS measure.

The subjects in this study were volunteers ranging in age from 18 to 28. The total sample of 207 was composed of 92 males and 115 females. All subjects were group administered the revised IPTIS followed by the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI). The reliability of the revised IPTIS was determined by a Guttman split-half reliability procedure.

Concurrent validity and the influence of social desirability was assessed by employing a Pearson product moment correlation between the revised IPTIS and the criterion scales of the EPI

The results suggested that the revised IPTIS was a sound psychometric inventory with a wide range of variability and was sensitive to varying degrees of rational and/or irrational tendencies. The inventory demonstrated adequate reliability with strong internal consistency ($r = .90$, $p < .01$). The revised IPTIS demonstrated good concurrent validity with neuroticism ($r = .68$, $p < .01$) and was not significantly influenced by social desirability ($r = -.23$, $p > .01$).

It was concluded that the revised IPTIS appeared to be a reliable and valid measure of irrational and/or neurotic tendencies. It did generalize and extend quite well to a new sample from another population and maintained sound psychometric characteristics. The results supported and extended the conclusions of Ross (1976) and also the ABC theory of emotional disturbance as presented by Ellis (1962). It was suggested that the revised IPTIS appeared to provide a useful tool both for future research and clinical practice.

Introduction and Review of Literature

From the ancient Stoic philosopher, in the first century A.D., Epictetus wrote in The Enchiridion: "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the view which they take of them" (Ellis, 1973, p. 167). In the mid 1950's Albert Ellis began developing a theory of personality, psychopathology and a method of psychotherapy drawing from and extending this philosophy. Summarized, Ellis (1962) states that A is an objective event or stimuli, B is a cognitive evaluation of the event and C is the resulting emotional response. In other words, when a highly charged emotional response follows a personally significant event, it may appear that A causes C, but realistically the emotional response is largely caused by the individuals belief or cognitive evaluation. Conclusions from what is now a classic article by Schacter and Singer (1962) report that cognitive factors appear to be indispensable elements in any formulation of emotion. Other studies by Schacter and Wheeler (1962) and Latane' and Schachter (1962) support their conclusions and the ABC theory of emotional disturbance.

Ellis (1962), in his system of psychotherapy, maintains that since cognition precedes and accompanies emotions, one

must begin changing cognitive evaluations before the undesirable emotional response will be significantly affected. Agreeably, human beings function as whole organisms who think, feel, and act. The degree of success in therapy depends largely upon how well the individual internalizes and incorporates rational cognition into daily life. Consequently, changing one's thinking is only the initial, and generally the easiest, step toward behavioral change. Ellis believes that an individual's healthy, as well as pathological, symptoms are not exclusively the product of social learning, but the result of what he labels "biosocial" learning (Ellis, 1973). This is the interaction between the way one thinks, feels, and acts. In other words, the environment interacts through the body and mind, thus producing the self, i.e., an organism which is the product of the interacting prerequisites. The same is true for all other living organisms, but mankind has cognitive abilities or intellect and tends to be self-talking and self-evaluating, having powerful and innately predisposed tendencies to think in rational as well as irrational and self-defeating ways. This makes mankind uniquely neurotic to greater or lesser degrees. An individual behaving in an irrational manner (such as depression) has a logical reason within his or her irrational belief system (e.g., "I need him and can't live without him.") for feeling helpless and

hopeless just as any living organism would if something really needed was abruptly removed (e.g., air, water, food, and shelter).

One basic symptom of emotional disturbance is demandingness and intolerance of oneself and/or others, probably the result of inconsistent love, approval, and success (either actual or perceived). Misleadingly, individuals subjectively define merely their personal desire for love, approval, success, and comfort as needs, oftentimes resulting in panic and self-defeating behaviors. The degree of pathology would depend on how strongly one has formed and holds to such demanding beliefs. Habitual patterns evolve during early childhood forming the personality or self, and will most likely continue in a similar pattern unless there is a significant intervention allowing one to begin thinking, feeling, and behaving more independently. In short, to become less narrow-minded and more accepting and tolerant of reality. The process of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) involves actively confronting and disputing self-defeating attitudes, thus helping the individual surrender the old and adopt new ways of evaluating the same or similar objective events. The individual is then given active homework assignments as an exercise in coordinating thoughts, feelings, and behavior.

Cognition can be coordinated with bodily functions and strengthen or weaken the organism through the process of

detachment. When an individual cognitively evaluates an event implicit verbalizations are used to describe and understand the event, i.e., self-talk. This is the mechanism by which the individual either reinforces or works toward extinguishing the well ingrained influences of the past. Thus Ellis concludes that it is not entirely one's miserable past which causes the present undesirable emotion, but the consistent reindoctrination of old and strongly reinforced beliefs.

Several studies lend support that self verbalizations affect emotional states. Rimm and Litvak (1969) report that affective verbal stimuli are more emotionally arousing than neutral stimuli, concluding that self-verbalizations have a direct influence on emotional arousal. In another study, using the galvanic skin response (GSR) as a measure of affective arousal, Russell and Brandsma (1974) conclude that irrational self-verbalizations were capable of producing an emotional response in line with Ellis' ABC theory and predictions derived from classical conditioning theory. Rational-Emotive theory appears to be well grounded in terms of empirical research and practitioners of RET claim remarkable success (DiLoreto, 1971; Ellis, 1957; Karst & Trexler, 1970; Maultsby, 1971c; Meichenbaum, 1971; Meichenbaum, Gilmore, & Fedoravicus, 1971; Taft, 1965; Trexler & Karst, 1973; Trexler, 1973).

But what is considered to be rational or irrational? Ellis (1962) presented eleven specific values or attitudes which he considered to be irrational and common throughout our culture. He claimed that strong endorsement of these values would inevitably lead to widespread neurosis. McDonald and Games (1973), in an attempt to validate Ellis' eleven irrational values, reported significant relationships between those eleven values and (a) Eysencks' Neuroticism Scale, (b) the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, and (c) Internal-External Locus of Control. Their results were interpreted as providing support for the theory that neuroticism and emotional disturbance is, for the most part, the result of harboring an irrational belief system.

Employing the ABC theory of Ellis, Maultsby (1971a) developed a modification of RET and called his system Rational-Behavior Therapy (RBT). He operationally defined rational behavior around five criterion. Maultsby stated that one's behavior is rational if it (1) is based on objective reality, (2) is life preserving, (3) is goal producing, (4) eliminates significant emotional conflict, and (5) eliminates significant trouble with others. The first criterion, i.e., objective reality, is defined as that which has its essentials for existence fulfilled (e.g., reality is free of value judgments, neither good nor bad, it just is). Or relating to cognition, objective reality is defined as verbalizations of facts and events that could be measured by a recording

device (e.g., a camera) or other means, such as statistics. Maultsby believes the brain functions poorly as a camera and evaluates reality much the way a programmed computer would interpret and respond to incoming data. One program would differentiate the significant from the insignificant data (analogous to perception) and a second program would analyze the data (analogous to thinking). The interaction between the two would determine the direction and degree of the response. The second criterion is defined as thoughts and behavior leading to preserving one's life. The remaining criterion are self-explanatory, though very subjective in nature and fluctuating from time to time. Goals change among and between individuals as does tolerance to personal and environmental discomfort. Thus, rational behavior is not absolute, but must be tailored among and between individuals to help achieve a common goal, such as a more rational and unified society. A rationally thinking individual perceives or accepts reality as it is and then acts in one's own self-defined best interest in order to pursue individual goals.

When an event is perceived, it is evaluated using symbols which are learned associations with reality. Perceptions are then evaluated and labeled by one's attitudes over and over again. Consequently, one learns to form strong opinions about reality, which are many times based on insufficient and inaccurate information, such as

"snakes are slimy and evil," "that dirty louse," etc. In addition, other statements like, "I should not have failed my final exam," in essence deny reality and often lead to self-defeating behavior, e.g., guilt. Realistically, one should have done exactly what he did because all of the prerequisites were there in order for the event to occur. Consequently, if he desires to pass the next exam, he had better work toward establishing the prerequisites, i.e., studying rather than prerequisites leading to self-devaluation. Actually, he wished he had not failed, but wishing in this manner is quite distinct from reality. This distinction is grossly evident in neurotic and/or psychotic behavior.

Maultsby (1971a) collected numerous statements which he found to be consistently adopted by clients with whom he worked. He categorized them into three separate inventories measuring perceptions, beliefs, and traits. For example: "I am a real louse," is an inaccurate perception stemming from the belief that, "I should not have failed." The trait would be the symptom of anger or guilt. Maultsby entitled his inventory, Your Irrational Personality Trait Inventory Scale (YIPTIS). The inventory consists of the Common Perception Inventory, Common Belief Inventory and Common Trait Inventory, totaling 137 items. He incorporated all three measures since rational and/or irrational tendencies are global patterns and not only a

process of objective cognitive criteria. In other words, an individual can adopt irrational beliefs, but the degree to which they are internalized is reflected by feelings and behavioral traits. He noted that this inventory was developed primarily as a counseling facilitator and not specifically for research purposes.

Ross (Note 1) modified Maultsby's YIPTIS and designed a revised form called Irrational Personality Traits Inventory Scale (IPTIS). The instrument consists of 52 items designed to assess the global degree to which high school students have irrational perceptions, beliefs, and traits about themselves and others. The items were selected from the initial 137 items by selecting only those which demonstrated high internal consistency (i.e., item-total correlations greater than .40). Developmental data were collected from two stratified random samples of high school students ($n = 419$ and 216). He reported that the instrument correlated significantly with the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale ($r = .78$). He concluded that his findings were consistent with the theoretical notions of irrationality and anxiety as explained by Maultsby (1971a). His report also indicated that the instrument had high internal consistency ($r = .94$). The internal consistency of perceptions, beliefs, and traits were felt in line with Maultsby's operational definition of irrationality.

In summary, the ABC theory of Ellis holds that emotional disturbance primarily results from consistent reindoctri-
nation of unrealistic values adopted by an innately
predisposed and self-evaluating human being. Individuals
imply agreement or disagreement to such values via implicit
verbalizations or self-talk, which may or may not be
accurate interpretations of reality. Maultsby (1971a)
introduced a modification of RET and called his system RBT.
He presented five criterion for evaluating rational or
irrational tendencies. These criterion for rational
behavior were a combination of objective and subjective
evaluations. Throughout his years of clinical practice,
Maultsby collected many irrational beliefs, faulty per-
ceptions, and traits symptomatic of irrationality. From
this collection he developed a personality inventory called
YIPTIS. A revised form of this instrument, called the
revised IPTIS, was constructed by Ross (Note 1) drawing
from the YIPTIS item pool. This new form was developed
with ninth, tenth, and eleventh grade high school students.
The revised IPTIS demonstrated sound psychometric charac-
teristics as well as significant correlations with anxiety
with the original developmental sample.

The general purpose of this study was to extend Ross'
work to a new sample from another population. More
specifically the study was designed to: (a) determine the
reliability of the revised IPTIS with a new sample from an

older population, i.e., college students, (b) assess its concurrent validity with a measure of neuroticism, and (c) evaluate the possible effects of a socially desirable response set on the revised IPTIS measure. The results of this study would be expected to: (1) expand the reliability and validity of the revised IPTIS by generalizing and extending the results of Ross (Note 1) to a sample from an older population while evaluating the possible influence of social desirability, (2) lend theoretical support to the ABC theory, and (3) provide further basis for evaluating the usefulness of the revised IPTIS for both future research and clinical practice.

Method

Revised IPTIS

The revised Irrational Personality Trait Inventory Scale (IPTIS) is an instrument consisting of 52 items designed to assess the degree to which individuals may have irrational perceptions, beliefs, and traits about themselves and others. Ross (Note 1) selected items from an initial pool of 137 items on the YIPTIS (Maultsby, 1971a). Only those items which demonstrated high internal consistency (i.e., item-total correlations greater than .40) were selected. A copy of the inventory is presented in Appendix A. The original developmental data for the revised IPTIS were collected from two groups of ninth, tenth, and eleventh grade high school students ($n = 419$ and 216). The inventory showed a high degree of internal consistency ($r = .94$) and correlated relatively highly with the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale ($r = .78$). The subject response and scoring modes were on a self-rating five point Likert scale ranging from "never" to "usually" in regards to items identifying irrationality. For the purpose of the present study items were ordered randomly on the test booklet and did not appear in the same order as in the

original revised IPTIS. This step was taken to reduce the possible influence of response bias relating to item order.

Criterion Measures

The Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968) was utilized as a measure of irrational and neurotic tendencies. Eysenck identifies neuroticism as indicative of emotional lability and over-reactivity. High scoring individuals tend to be emotionally over-responsive and have difficulties returning to a normal state after emotional experiences. The EPI was selected primarily because: (1) it was reported to be a reliable and valid measure of neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968), (2) it was relatively short and took minimal time in administration, and (3) it also yielded a social desirability or response set score.

Subjects

Subjects were volunteers from the total available population of undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology classes at Western Kentucky University. There were a total of 207 subjects consisting of 92 males and 115 females between the ages of 18 and 28.

Procedure

The revised IPTIS was administered in a classroom setting followed by the EPI during the spring semester of the school year. Instructions were given verbally and in written form and are presented in Appendix A. Subjects

were only identified by their sex and age. Each was instructed to record his/her responses on separate answer sheets, i.e., one for each inventory.

Statistical Analysis

Both answer sheets were collected from each subject and machine scored. Statistical analyses were performed to determine descriptive characteristics, reliability, and validity. A Guttman split-half reliability procedure was used to assess internal consistency. A Pearson product moment correlation coefficient was employed to assess concurrent validity and influence of social desirability. Results were reported significant at the .01 level.

Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics obtained in this study for the revised IPTIS are presented in Appendix B. A comparative analysis of these statistics with those obtained by Ross was impossible since his data were not available. However, the data from this study suggested that the revised IPTIS was a sound inventory with a wide range of variability and was sensitive to varying degrees of rational and irrational tendencies.

The Guttman split-half yielded a reliability coefficient of .90, $p < .01$. When compared with the results of Ross ($r = .94$), the revised IPTIS did generalize and extend quite well to a new sample from another population of older subjects and maintained high internal consistency. In addition, it was found that random ordering of the items did not significantly affect its reliability. Consequently, the revised IPTIS demonstrated adequate reliability in the form of high internal consistency.

The Pearson product moment procedure between the revised IPTIS and the neuroticism scale of the EPI resulted in a concurrent validity coefficient of .68, $p < .01$. As reported previously, Ross found a significant correlation ($r = .78$) between the revised IPTIS and anxiety. By

comparing the two correlation coefficients, the revised IPTIS was found to extend from a specific irrational trait, i.e., anxiety, to a broader psychological measure of neuroticism. Consequently, the revised IPTIS demonstrated good concurrent validity with a specific irrational trait as well as the measure of neuroticism as defined by Eysenck. Thus, Maultsby's operational definition of irrational tendencies (as measured by the revised IPTIS) was consistent with Eysenck's broader notion of neuroticism.

The Pearson correlation procedure between the revised IPTIS and the social desirability scale on the EPI resulted in a concurrent validity coefficient of $-.32$, $p > .01$. Consequently, a socially desirable response set did not appear to be related to the measure of irrationality obtained on the revised IPTIS. In other words, the revised IPTIS measure appeared independent of a "faking good" response mode.

Rational theory, whether employing the techniques of Ellis or Maultsby, is a very objective and humanistic method of perceiving and facilitating the whole human being. In psychotherapy attention is focused on thinking, feeling, and acting with attempts to help others perceive or accept reality as it is and then acting in one's own self-defined best interest in order to pursue individual goals.

The revised IPTIS, an inventory that claims to measure how an individual thinks, feels, and acts, was investigated

as to the soundness of its psychometric characteristics. More specifically it was to (a) determine the reliability of the revised IPTIS with a new sample from an older population, i.e., college students, (b) assess its concurrent validity with a measure of neuroticism, and (c) evaluate the possible effects of socially desirable response set on the revised IPTIS measure.

The results from this study suggested that the revised IPTIS was a sound psychometric inventory with a wide range of variability and was sensitive to varying degrees of rational and irrational tendencies. The inventory demonstrated good reliability with strong internal consistency. It did generalize and extend quite well to a new sample and another population of older subjects and maintained sound psychometric characteristics. In addition, the revised IPTIS demonstrated good concurrent validity with both a specific irrational trait, i.e., anxiety, as well as a broader measure of neuroticism as defined by Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968). Finally, social desirability or "faking good" did not appear significantly related to the scores obtained on the revised IPTIS.

In conclusion, the revised IPTIS was demonstrated to be a reliable and valid measure of irrational and/or neurotic tendencies. The results supported and extended the conclusions of Ross (Note 1). Also, Maultsby's operational definition of irrational tendencies (as measured by the

revised IPTIS) were found to be correlated with Eysenck's measure of neuroticism. The results also lent support to the ABC theory of emotional disturbance as presented by Ellis (1962). Thus, the revised IPTIS appeared to provide a useful tool both in future research and clinical practice.

Future research may be directed toward extending and generalizing the revised IPTIS to other populations such as younger or older subjects than reported presently, inpatient/outpatient mental health facilities, and other specific neurotic traits.

Appendix A

Revised IPTIS

Revised IPTIS

Name _____ Age _____ Sex _____ Date _____

INSTRUCTIONS

The following statements describe beliefs many people hold, feelings, and perceptions (observations) that people often make about themselves. Beside each statement is an estimate range. Please mark on the answer sheet (not the booklet) the word which seems most accurate and appropriate to you.

- a. NEVER
- b. SOMETIMES
- c. OFTEN AS NOT
- d. FREQUENTLY
- e. USUALLY

This form is concerned with your usual state of mind, so answer with your most common experience regarding each item. Please respond to each item honestly and be sure not to skip any statements. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the statements.

	NEVER	SOME- TIMES	OFTEN AS NOT	FRE- QUENTLY	USUALLY
1. I believe I am a born worrier.	a	b	c	d	e
2. I won't be able to accept myself until I get more self-confidence.	a	b	c	d	e
3. No one seems to care enough about me.	a	b	c	d	e
4. It seems to me that I don't live up to my potential (i.e., abilities and talents).	a	b	c	d	e
5. I believe there is me and another "real" me.	a	b	c	d	e

	<u>NEVER</u>	<u>SOME-</u> <u>TIMES</u>	<u>OFTEN</u> <u>AS NOT</u>	<u>FRE-</u> <u>QUENTLY</u>	<u>USUALLY</u>
6. I feel cut off or alienated from people or the world around me.	a	b	c	d	e
7. I feel as though I am me and not me at the same time.	a	b	c	d	e
8. In order to get people to like me, I pretend to be different from how I really am.	a	b	c	d	e
9. Even now, if I think of regretted past events, I still get angry, anxious or depressed.	a	b	c	d	e
10. When I am upset or angry about some thing or someone, I am likely to say things like "why does everything have to happen to me?" or "how could he or she have done such a thing?"	a	b	c	d	e
11. My emotions change from one extreme to another within minutes without my knowing why.	a	b	c	d	e
12. I don't get over emotional hurts quickly.	a	b	c	d	e
13. I am dissatisfied with myself as a person.	a	b	c	d	e

	<u>NEVER</u>	<u>SOME-</u> <u>TIMES</u>	<u>OFTEN</u> <u>AS NOT</u>	<u>FRE-</u> <u>QUENTLY</u>	<u>USUALLY</u>
14. I am very sensitive to social slights: i.e., my feelings are hurt easily.	a	b	c	d	e
15. My life seems worthless and unproductive.	a	b	c	d	e
16. I believe that if people would just be honest with me, I wouldn't have so many emotional problems.	a	b	c	d	e
17. When faced with a difficult task or something that I don't want to do, I am likely to start thinking that "I can't do it" or "I am going to blow it."	a	b	c	d	e
18. I feel inferior to some other people.	a	b	c	d	e
19. I really get upset if I think people are thinking about me things that I do not like people to think about me.	a	b	c	d	e
20. I have guilt feelings about my failures.	a	b	c	d	e
21. I think that I am a nothing, no good, worthless person, and I get very upset.	a	b	c	d	e
22. Even though I enjoy someone's company, if they don't love me or care for me as much as I do for them, I feel badly.	a	b	c	d	e

	<u>NEVER</u>	<u>SOME- TIMES</u>	<u>OFTEN AS NOT</u>	<u>FRE- QUENTLY</u>	<u>USUALLY</u>
23. I have tried to change myself, but it seems I can't do it.	a	b	c	d	e
24. I believe I need more self-confidence.	a	b	c	d	e
25. I get very upset when I am alone for many hours or a day or so.	a	b	c	d	e
26. I am uncomfortably depressed.	a	b	c	d	e
27. When trying to make decisions, I change my mind back and forth while getting progressively upset about the outcome.	a	b	c	d	e
28. What some people think of me is as important to my feelings as what I think of myself.	a	b	c	d	e
29. I refuse to accept myself when I am a failure.	a	b	c	d	e
30. I don't seem to be as good a person as I can and ought to be.	a	b	c	d	e
31. I believe that if certain people were to treat me the way they should, I could feel better and/or accept myself better.	a	b	c	d	e
32. The solution to most of my problems is for certain people to care enough for me to meet my dependency needs.	a	b	c	d	e

	<u>NEVER</u>	<u>SOME-</u> <u>TIMES</u>	<u>OFTEN</u>	<u>FRE-</u> <u>QUENTLY</u>	<u>USUALLY</u>
33. I feel anxious, or nervous, or "high-strung"--almost like I am waiting for an unknown terrible thing to happen.	a	b	c	d	e
34. I find myself thinking about things I don't want to think about.	a	b	c	d	e
35. I wake up feeling afraid to face the day.	a	b	c	d	e
36. I worry about or I get afraid of the "bad" or negative things that people, even strangers, may think or say about me, that I don't do some harmless fun things that I want to do.	a	b	c	d	e
37. It seems to me that I am a failure.	a	b	c	d	e
38. I don't seem to have enough self-confidence.	a	b	c	d	e
39. Even though I don't experience physical pain, when people behave toward me in an undesirable manner, I feel badly.	a	b	c	d	e
40. I really get upset if I think that I have been used.	a	b	c	d	e
41. I believe that I would like and accept myself better if I had more self-confidence.	a	b	c	d	e

	<u>NEVER</u>	<u>SOME- TIMES</u>	<u>OFTEN AS NOT</u>	<u>FRE- QUENTLY</u>	<u>USUALLY</u>
42. I spend a lot of time trying to decide what the true meaning of life is.	a	b	c	d	e
43. When people treat me unfairly or unjustly, it causes me emotional pain that is worse than most physical pain.	a	b	c	d	e
44. I actually hate myself.	a	b	c	d	e
45. When I am attempting a difficult task, I am likely to give up quickly and later realize that I could have done the task if I had continued. Then I feel guilty or dissatisfied with myself as a person.	a	b	c	d	e
46. When things that really matter to me don't go right, it upsets me very much.	a	b	c	d	e
47. I feel uncomfortable lonely even when there are people around me.	a	b	c	d	e
48. I get upset about trivial things.	a	b	c	d	e
49. I get upset about problems I have getting along with people.	a	b	c	d	e
50. The very time I decide to be carefree and loose, something bad always seems to happen.	a	b	c	d	e

	<u>NEVER</u>	<u>SOME-</u> <u>TIMES</u>	<u>OFTEN</u> <u>AS NOT</u>	<u>FRE-</u> <u>QUENTLY</u>	<u>USUALLY</u>
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51. When I don't stay a little tense about things I have to do, I forget to do them.

a	b	c	d	e
---	---	---	---	---

52. It seems to me that I am not intelligent enough.

a	b	c	d	e
---	---	---	---	---

Appendix B

Revised IPTIS Descriptive Statistics

Revised IPTIS Descriptive Statistics
(N = 207)

Mean	69
Std. Dev.	28
Variance	793
Skewness	.58
Kurtosis	.49
Range	168
Min. Score	3
Max. Score	171

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
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CORRECTION



***PRECEDING IMAGE HAS BEEN
REFILMED
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY OR TO
CORRECT A POSSIBLE ERROR***

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Reference Notes

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